| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: dev: init_can_skb(): restore skb header initialization
Commit 9f10374bb024 ("can: remove private CAN skb headroom infrastructure")
removed the skb_reset_mac_header()/skb_reset_network_header()/
skb_reset_transport_header() calls from init_can_skb(). As a result, RX
skbs from alloc_can_skb() and friends again carry mac_header = 0xFFFF.
When such an skb reaches packet_rcv_spkt() (SOCK_PACKET), the push length
calculation overflows and triggers skb_under_panic -> kernel BUG -> full
machine panic.
The same issue was originally reported in 2014 on linux-can and fixed by
commit 969439016d2c ("can: add missing initialisations in CAN related
skbuffs"). packet_rcv_spkt() itself has never been hardened: only
packet_rcv() and tpacket_rcv() gained dev_has_header() checks in
commit d549699048b4 ("net/packet: fix packet receive on L3 devices
without visible hard header"). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/packet: guard the ll header push in packet_rcv_spkt()
packet_rcv_spkt() restores the link layer header with
skb_push(skb, skb->data - skb_mac_header(skb));
That subtraction is only meaningful when the device actually has a link
layer header. packet_rcv() and tpacket_rcv() both wrap it in
dev_has_header(), which is also the predicate the block comment at the
top of the file states the restore in terms of; packet_rcv_spkt() does
not. commit d549699048b4 ("net/packet: fix packet receive on L3
devices without visible hard header") introduced the helper and changed
the two call sites, and this one stayed behind.
A device without a visible ll header can leave skb->mac_header at the
0xFFFF sentinel that __alloc_skb() initialises it to. A CAN skb does:
init_can_skb() sets pkt_type and ip_summed but does not reset the
headers, and commit 9f10374bb024 ("can: remove private CAN skb
headroom infrastructure") dropped the skb_reset_*_header() calls that
used to be there. skb_mac_header() is then 0xFFFF, the length becomes
a large negative number and skb_push() reports it through
skb_under_panic() -- from softirq context, so it is a full system panic
even with panic_on_oops=0:
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff8bd21bc1 len:-65455 put:-65471 head:... data:... tail:0x50 end:0x180 dev:can0
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:214!
RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x50/0x60
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
skb_push+0x38/0x40
packet_rcv_spkt+0xe1/0x170
__netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x7e8/0xd30
...
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
The socket type is reachable: packet_create() accepts SOCK_PACKET
alongside SOCK_RAW and SOCK_DGRAM behind the same CAP_NET_RAW check,
and neither the socket length nor a capability check keeps it away
from a CAN interface.
The missing skb_reset_*_header() calls in init_can_skb() are a
regression in their own right and are being fixed separately, but a
packet socket should not turn a link layer that did not initialise its
mac header into a kernel panic. Guard the push the way the other two
receive paths do.
Tested on v7.3-rc5 under QEMU with a slcan device on a pty, which is
the driver RX path: vcan does not reproduce it, because can_send()
resets the headers on the way out. One SOCK_PACKET socket bound to
can0 and one frame written into the line discipline panics an
unpatched kernel with the trace above; the same image with this patch
prints no panic and powers off normally. Both kernels are this tree,
defconfig plus CONFIG_CAN_SLCAN=y, differing only in this hunk. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/damon/ops-common: use a page-aligned address in damon_ptep_mkold()
__damon_va_prepare_access_check() picks a random byte address within the
region and stores it in r->sampling_addr. damon_va_mkold() passes it into
a page table walk, which hands it to damon_ptep_mkold() as the address of
the page to sample:
damon_va_mkold(mm, r->sampling_addr)
damon_va_walk_page_range(mm, addr, addr + 1)
damon_mkold_pmd_entry()
damon_ptep_mkold(pte, vma, addr)
ptep_test_and_clear_young(vma, addr, pte)
mmu_notifier_clear_young(mm, addr, addr + PAGE_SIZE)
For arm64, before commit 6f0e1142173a ("arm64: mm: support batch clearing
of the young flag for large folios"), the contpte helper walked exactly
CONT_PTES entries from the aligned-down page table pointer and used @addr
only to pass down to each entry, so an unaligned value was harmless:
ptep = contpte_align_down(ptep);
addr = ALIGN_DOWN(addr, CONT_PTE_SIZE);
for (i = 0; i < CONT_PTES; i++, ptep++, addr += PAGE_SIZE)
Now the range to walk is derived from @addr instead: end = addr + nr *
PAGE_SIZE, rounded up to CONT_PTE_SIZE. For a sample in the last page of
a contpte block, the sub-page offset puts end just past the block
boundary, so the round-up lands a whole block further and the walk clears
PTE_AF in CONT_PTES entries beyond the sampled block. For the last block
in a page table page, those entries are past the end of that page, so the
walk writes into the page that follows.
Triggered by the full 7.1/7.2 kernel selftest suite on arm64 (EC2
c/m6g.4xlarge). The kernel sometimes crashes at or shortly after the
DAMON test.
What the overrun does depends on the page that happens to follow the page
table, so there is no single signature. If that page is read-only, the
write faults in the sampling path itself:
Unable to handle kernel write to read-only memory at virtual address ffff0003c5d2d000
FSC = 0x0f: level 3 permission fault
CM = 0, WnR = 1, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 3487 Comm: kdamond.2
pc : contpte_test_and_clear_young_ptes+0x70/0xc0
lr : damon_ptep_mkold+0x1e8/0x1f8
Call trace:
contpte_test_and_clear_young_ptes+0x70/0xc0 (P)
damon_mkold_pmd_entry+0x150/0x170
walk_pmd_range+0x110/0x2b0
walk_pud_range+0x10c/0x208
walk_pgd_range+0x134/0x258
__walk_page_range+0x98/0x1b0
walk_page_range_vma_unsafe+0x90/0x148
walk_page_range_vma+0x28/0x40
damon_va_walk_page_range+0x114/0x2b8
damon_va_prepare_access_checks+0xec/0x1a8
kdamond_fn+0x534/0x770
kthread+0x128/0x138
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Otherwise the page is writable, the PTE_AF clearing succeeds silently and
the damage only surfaces later, in whatever happened to own the page, so
the backtrace is unrelated to DAMON and differs between runs.
Pass a page-aligned address to the ptep_test_and_clear_young() call in
damon_ptep_mkold(), which is the only place DAMON can reach
contpte_test_and_clear_young_ptes() from. Nothing else sees the aligned
address, and r->sampling_addr itself is left as is, so the sampling and
region bookkeeping semantics are unchanged. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock/virtio: account only unread bytes in read_skb()
After a partial stream receive, rx_bytes tracks the unread suffix while
buf_used and peer credit still cover the whole packet.
virtio_transport_read_skb() dequeues that packet but passes pkt_len for
both counters, underflowing rx_bytes.
On a connected CID_LOCAL stream with an SK_SKB verdict, a 40-byte read
from a 100-byte packet made SIOCINQ report -40, an empty recv return
ELOOP, and poll report the empty socket readable. After verdict detach,
receiving 40 bytes wrapped the counter to zero and hid those queued bytes
until one more byte arrived. The fixed run kept the counter balanced
and exposed all queued data immediately.
This was found during an LLM-assisted manual source audit of VSOCK
receive accounting while re-evaluating virtio_transport_read_skb() after
CVE-2024-50169.
Subtract only skb->len minus the VSOCK offset from rx_bytes. Retain the
full packet length for buf_used and peer credit. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/imagination: Size page table preallocation by device address
Commit 0a8224058a58 ("drm/imagination: Fix page count for page table for
map() interface") passed the device address to
pvr_mmu_op_context_create(), but the preallocation is still sized from
device_addr + sgt_offset with an exclusive end. The offset into the
object's pages has no place in a device-virtual range, and the exclusive
end allocates one table too many when the range ends on a table
boundary.
Count the tables from device_addr and the inclusive end of the range.
The new calculation does not take page table indices into account. This
fixes another issue with the previous implementation, where the
difference between start and end indices could underflow when a mapping
crossed a page table boundary. This would lead to the driver
preallocating a huge number of MMU pages, exhausting system memory and
triggering an out of memory panic.
[Alessio: add paragraph to point out OOM bug being fixed, cc stable] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mmc: core: Add validation for host-provided max_segs
The max_segs field is of type unsigned short, and if a host driver
sets an excessively large value, it may be truncated to zero. This
can cause mmc_alloc_sg() to call kmalloc_objs() with a zero size
allocation request, which leads to undefined behavior.
Under the SLUB allocator, kmalloc(0) returns a special pointer
(ZERO_SIZE_PTR). The subsequent 'if (sg)' check will evaluate to
true, and sg_init_table() will then attempt to access invalid memory,
resulting in a crash:
dwmmc_rockchip 2a310000.mmc: Successfully tuned phase to 133
mmc1: new UHS-I speed SDR104 SDHC card at address aaaa
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 0000001ffffffff0
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x0000000096000004
EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000102c88000
[0000001ffffffff0] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 102 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc6-next-20260331-00013-g4d93c25963c5-dirty #80 PREEMPT
Hardware name: Rockchip RK3576 EVB V10 Board (DT)
Workqueue: events_freezable mmc_rescan
pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : sg_init_table+0x2c/0x50
lr : sg_init_table+0x24/0x50
sp : ffff8000837db710
x29: ffff8000837db710 x28: 000000000000c000 x27: 0000000000000300
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000040 x24: ffff0000c46a0000
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffff0000c0c73c00 x21: 0000000000000010
x20: 0000000000000010 x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 000000000000002c
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000001 x15: 0000000000000000
x14: 0000000000000400 x13: ffff8000837dc000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: ffff0000c0c73ca0 x10: 0000000000000040 x9 : 459ec1f0abbdbb00
x8 : 0000001fffffffe0 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000000000003f
x5 : 0000000000035579 x4 : 0000000000000901 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000010
Call trace:
sg_init_table+0x2c/0x50 (P)
mmc_mq_init_request+0x64/0x90
blk_mq_alloc_map_and_rqs+0x3ac/0x480
blk_mq_alloc_set_map_and_rqs+0x98/0x1e0
blk_mq_alloc_tag_set+0x1c0/0x290
mmc_init_queue+0x120/0x370
mmc_blk_alloc_req+0x150/0x420
To prevent this, add a validation check in mmc_mq_init_request() to
detect when sg_len (derived from max_segs) is zero. If sg_len is zero,
we return an error and print an error message, allowing host driver
developers to identify and fix incorrect max_segs configuration.
This is a defensive measure that ensures the MMC core fails gracefully
when host drivers provide invalid max_segs values, rather than crashing
with a page fault. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xen/gntalloc: validate grant count before allocation
gntalloc_ioctl_alloc() allocates the grant-id array before checking
whether the requested count fits within the global grant limit. Counts
above that limit cannot succeed, so reject them before the
user-controlled allocation reaches kcalloc().
Use a subtraction-based check while holding gref_mutex so adding the
requested count cannot wrap. Also cast the count before advancing the
per-file index so the page-size multiplication is performed in 64-bit
arithmetic. |
| Incorrect boundary conditions in the SVG component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 158.0.1 and Thunderbird 158.0.1. |
| libssh2 1.11.1, fixed in commit 97acf3d, contains an out-of-bounds write vulnerability in ssh2_transport_read() that fails to enforce upper bounds on packet_length field. Remote attackers can send crafted SSH packets with excessively large packet_length values to corrupt heap memory and achieve remote code execution. |
| The GUIX binary resource loader never checks that a font page's glyph range is well formed. `gx_page_header_first_glyph` and `gx_page_header_last_glyph` are read verbatim from the file and only the upper bound of `last_glyph` is validated, so a page declaring `first_glyph > last_glyph` makes `last - first + 1` underflow to a very large unsigned count.
That count is multiplied by a glyph record size to reserve the load buffer, and the multiply is unchecked, so it wraps to a small value and the loader allocates a buffer far smaller than the data it is about to write. The load pass then recomputes the count in a narrower type and writes attacker-controlled glyph records into the undersized buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: properly decrypt filenames in vmalloc() buffers
The fscrypt subsystem uses the scatterlist crypto API, inheriting its
requirement that any buffers are in the linear mapping region. However,
the messenger client uses kvmalloc() to create buffers for messages,
which will occasionally place those buffers in the vmalloc() region when
physical memory fragmentation doesn't permit a large enough kmalloc().
The various callers of ceph_fname_to_usr() directly pass (slices of) raw
messages from the MDS without considering that the messages may be in
vmalloc() buffers, resulting in oopses especially on non-x86 platforms
(see 'Closes:' for more details and a reproducer).
Make ceph_fname_to_usr() explicitly tolerant of vmalloc()-allocated
fname->ctext, fname->name, and/or oname->name buffers, using `tname`
(which, when non-null, must be a linear address; when null, is briefly
allocated as necessary) as a bounce buffer to avoid passing any
inappropriate addresses to fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr().
Additionally change parse_reply_info_readdir() -- the only function to
supply its own `tname` -- to follow the new "tname must never come from
vmalloc()" rule by passing NULL when the message is not in the linear
region. Though this causes a per-dentry kmalloc()+kfree(), this overhead
exists only when processing the minority of messages that spill into
vmalloc(). My (crude) testing puts this at only about 1 in 8,000 readdir
messages. Still, if the overhead proves unreasonable in the future, it
is easy enough to mitigate: a future change could allocate a bounce
buffer in parse_reply_info_readdir() and use that as `tname` instead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/kexec_file: Prevent kexec range truncation
Sashiko AI review pointed out the following issue.
The __merge_memory_ranges() function incorrectly handles overlapping
memory ranges when merging them. Although sort_memory_ranges() sorts all
ranges by their start address in ascending order beforehand, the merge
logic remains defective in two ways:
1. It compares the current range's start against the previous element (i-1)
instead of the running target index (idx)
2. It unconditionally overwrites 'ranges[idx].end' with 'ranges[i].end'.
This logic flaw leads to critical memory truncation when a larger memory
range completely subsumes subsequent smaller ranges.
For example, consider a sorted input array with three ranges:
Range A (idx=0): [0x1000 - 0x9000]
Range B (i=1): [0x2000 - 0x5000] (completely inside Range A)
Range C (i=2): [0x6000 - 0x8000] (completely inside Range A)
1. When i=1 (Range B):
ranges[1].start (0x2000) <= ranges[0].end + 1 (0x9001) is TRUE.
The code executes: ranges[0].end = ranges[1].end, which erroneously
shrinks Range A's end from 0x9000 down to 0x5000.
2. When i=2 (Range C):
ranges[2].start (0x6000) <= ranges[1].end + 1 (0x5001) is FALSE.
The code falls into the else block, creating a broken new range.
As a result, valid memory fragments [0x5001 - 0x5fff] and [0x8001 - 0x9000]
are completely lost from the kexec exclude lists, potentially allowing
the crash kernel to overwrite active memory, causing data corruption
or crashes.
Fix this by ensuring the start of the current range is compared against the
end of the active merged range (idx), and use max() to safely prevent the
outer boundary from being truncated. |
| An integer overflow vulnerability in the license manager service could allow an unauthenticated attacker to crash the service. |
| A ThreadX module chooses `object_size` when it calls `txm_module_object_allocate`. The Module Manager adds its own 16-byte private header to that size and asked the object pool for the result **without checking the addition**. A size near the top of a `ULONG` wrapped, the pool served a block far smaller than the header, and the manager then wrote the header past the end of it and into the neighbouring byte-pool block. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vmwgfx: validate DRAW_PRIMITIVES header size before division
vmw_cmd_draw() computes
maxnum = (header->size - sizeof(cmd->body)) / sizeof(*decl);
where header->size is u32 and is taken straight from the user-supplied
command stream. When header->size is less than sizeof(cmd->body) the
unsigned subtraction wraps to nearly 4 GiB, producing a huge maxnum.
Any user-controlled cmd->body.numVertexDecls then passes the bound and
the loop dereferences decl[i] far past the end of the kernel command
bounce buffer, producing an out-of-bounds read of kernel memory.
Reject undersized headers up front. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: meson: aiu: Validate written enum values
The AIU HDMI and internal codec mux put callbacks use the written enum
value with snd_soc_enum_item_to_val() before checking whether the value is
valid for the enumeration.
Reject out-of-range values before converting the enum item, matching the
validation already done by the G12A HDMI and internal codec mux controls. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5: LAG, Fix off-by-one in single-FDB error rollback
On failure at index i, the reverse cleanup loop in
mlx5_lag_create_single_fdb() starts from i, so the failed index
itself is rolled back. That can operate on uninitialized state or
double-tear-down a rule the add_one path already self-rolled-back.
Start the rollback from i - 1 so only successfully-installed entries
are undone. |
| When libcurl is asked to perform automatic gzip decompression of
content-encoded HTTP responses with the `CURLOPT_ACCEPT_ENCODING` option,
**using zlib 1.2.0.3 or older**, an attacker-controlled integer overflow would
make libcurl perform a buffer overflow. |
| The Keccak XKCP SHA-3 reference implementation before fdc6fef has an integer overflow and resultant buffer overflow that allows attackers to execute arbitrary code or eliminate expected cryptographic properties. This occurs in the sponge function interface. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: libipw: reject too-short beacon and probe responses
libipw_process_probe_response() and the libipw_network_init() call it
makes assume the frame contains the full 36-byte beacon and probe
response prefix, but the ipw2100 and ipw2200 receive paths only
establish that a management frame carries the generic 24-byte
three-address header.
libipw_network_init() then computes the information element length as
stats->len - sizeof(*beacon)
stats->len is a u16 and sizeof() has type size_t, so the subtraction is
evaluated as size_t and wraps instead of going negative. Truncating
that to the u16 length parameter of libipw_parse_info_param() yields
65524 for a 24-byte beacon, and the parser then walks the receive
buffer as if it held almost 64 KiB of information elements, reading
past the allocation.
Reject the frame before any fixed field is touched.
Found by an AI-assisted review of length arithmetic in management frame
parsers. Verified with a KUnit case under Generic KASAN on arm64 under
QEMU; I do not have the hardware, so it is not tested on a real device. |
